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This paper examines the role of the public sector 
in providing additional information to exporters in 
developing countries as they seek to monitor and keep 
open their access to foreign markets by using the rules 
of the WTO system. It highlights new information 
generation and dissemination initiatives undertaken 
by the WTO Secretariat, Global Trade Alert, and the 
World Bank in response to the global economic crisis of 
This paper—a product of the Trade and Integration Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in 
the department to evaluate the impact that international institutions have on the market access. Policy Research Working 
Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at cbown@worldbank.org.   
2008–2009. Given trends in the imposition of new crisis-
era trade barriers that these initiatives have identified, 
the paper describes ways in which the new sources of 
rich and detailed data may be used to further assist 
developing country exporters that may lack the capacity 
to sufficiently monitor their trading interests by relying 
solely on private resources. 
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The WTO provides three critical services to the international trading system: a forum for 
multilateral negotiations, an apparatus to mediate the neutral arbitration of trade-related 
disputes between members, and the illumination of members’ changes to policies that 
affect foreign commercial interests. And yet, discussions of reform to the WTO system 
rarely address the third pillar of monitoring and transparency. This paper examines the 
issue of information generation and the role of surveillance in the WTO system.  
As motivation, one of the fundamental contributions of the WTO system’s 
architecture is that it allows for substantial monitoring of changes to the national policies 
that have an impact on the conditions of foreign market access and hence, the flows of 
international trade. The WTO architecture has resulted in a system of rules as well as 
reporting requirements that makes it possible to transmit information concerning how one 
member’s policy changes are expected to affect the foreign market access interests of 
exporters in other WTO Member economies. Monitoring may have never been more 
important for the sustainability of the rules-based trading system than during the height of 
the global economic crisis in 2008–2009. 
This paper addresses a number of questions related to the monitoring of the 
foreign market access interests of exporters in developing countries – especially those 
with profit margins so small relative to the gains from enforcement – most unlikely to 
devote the private resources to cover monitoring costs themselves. How does monitoring 
of their interests take place, and how does this compare to what theory suggests their 
strongest needs would be? As it is highly unlikely that developing country export 
interests are able to fully cover the needs themselves privately, is sufficiently detailed 
  2data and information being generated to enable other development-focused groups to step 
in to package the information into the format that is most useful to exporters’ needs? 
Finally, to what extent are groups monitoring and informing on the policy changes that 
might be violations of WTO commitments and thus potentially subject to action under 
WTO dispute settlement? 
As an underlying theoretical motivation, a number of factors contribute to why 
private actors, and especially those associated with exporting interests in developing 
countries, do not spend sufficient resources on monitoring their own foreign market 
access interests. First, because monitoring is costly and generates positive externalities so 
that others can free-ride off the benefits, the lesson from basic economics is that private 
actors do not perceive the right incentives to devote sufficient resources to monitoring 
their own interests. Second, the introduction of other development-friendly initiatives 
such as the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL), the developing country legal 
assistance centre established in 2001 that subsidises the cost of litigation of actual WTO 
disputes (but not the full cost of information generation), may have unintentionally 
deepened the disincentive for private sector law firms to do more monitoring on behalf of 
developing country exporters in particular.
1 The implication is that the international 
trading system is unlikely to have deployed either the optimal level or distribution of 
                                                           
1 See Bown (2009a, chapters 6 and 8). The theoretical argument is that providing subsidised support for 
developing countries to cover WTO litigation expenses but not information generation (i.e. ‘ambulance 
chasing’) reduces the incentive for private law firms to dig up such information on WTO violations that 
may adversely affect developing country exporters because the law firms are less likely to obtain the 
exporter’s actual (billable) litigation work as clients. 
  3surveillance of the WTO membership’s market access commitments; especially for the 
monitoring needs of developing countries. 
The fear of a global resort to protectionism during the global economic crisis of 
2008–2009 created a political opportunity to push forward the monitoring agenda, and 
this resulted in additional initiatives to monitor multilateral commitments under the 
trading system. To summarise the chain of events, the financial crisis in mid-2008 and its 
global spread resulted in a major shock to the international economic system. In 
particular, the fourth quarter of 2008 saw a sudden and unexpected drop in global trade 
flows. The year-on-year estimated decline in world trade during this time was over 10%; 
furthermore, large declines in trade took place simultaneously in each of the major 
trading regions including a 16% drop for Europe, a 7% decline for North America, and a 
5% decrease for Asia (WTO 2009: 3, chart I.5). The first quarter of 2009 saw another 
estimated (year-on-year) decline in world trade of 30%. The fall in trade during this 
period of 2008–2009 was so sudden and immediate that it was clearly unrelated to any 
major new global protectionist initiatives that had taken place up until then. Bown 
(2009b, table 7.4) provides one set of estimates concerning trade remedy data consistent 
with this. These results indicate that even under a hypothesised (though unlikely and 
subsequently unrealised) scenario that each trade remedy investigation initiated from first 
quarter (1Q) 2008 through  1Q 2009 were to result in prohibitive trade restrictions for the 
affected products, the upper bound estimate is that this might have affected less than 
0.5% of these economies’ imports. 
However, by early 2009, the main concern for trade policy was that the global 
economic recession that accompanied the financial crisis had resulted in widespread 
  4unemployment. Worsening macroeconomic conditions stoked fears of a resulting 
increase in calls for new trade barriers in recession-battered economies. As discussed 
below, at the macro-level there is evidence of a global increase in industry requests for 
new trade barriers in 2009; and it is also apparent from this data that the main increase in 
imposition of definitive new trade barriers did not take place until late 2009 (and into 
2010), i.e., after the sharp trade contraction. While new protectionism during the crisis 
was therefore not a cause of the large decline in global trade flows in the fourth quarter of 
2008 and the first quarter of 2009, a concern for the trading system is that such new 
barriers (imposed in late 2009 and into 2010) may create distortions that do not allow 
trade to achieve its otherwise natural growth trajectory as the global economy grows out 
of the recession. Furthermore and from a development perspective, the general global 
trends in new trade barriers are accompanied by the additional concern that a high share 
of the new trade barriers being imposed are affecting exporting firms in developing 
countries, and especially South–South trade flows.
2 Finally, the collective response of the 
WTO membership in 2009 was not to rely on dispute settlement initiatives to open up 
foreign markets that might be closing down – they combined to initiate only fourteen new 
disputes in 2009, only six of which were brought by developing countries.
3 
This paper thus considers the present and future of monitoring in the WTO 
system, with a particular emphasis on the surveillance needs of developing countries in 
                                                           
2 Examples of early research initiatives taking stock of protectionist data trends during the crisis include 
Newfarmer and Gamberoni (2009), Bown (2009b,c), and other contributions in the collections of Baldwin 
and Evenett (2009), Cattaneo, Evenett and Hoekman (2009), and Evenett, Hoekman and Cattaneo (2009). 
3 Over the period 2001–2008, WTO Members collectively initiated an average of 21 new disputes per year; 
developing countries initiated 11 of these disputes on average per year (Bown, 2009a, pp. 65–70).  
  5light of the global economic crisis. First, why focus on the foreign market access 
monitoring needs of developing countries? For a number of reasons, their needs are the 
most neglected under the current trading system, as there is very little private sector 
monitoring that looks out for their interests. The economic implications of this are likely 
to be quite important if it results in them having less secure access to foreign markets, 
because they are then unable to fully exploit international trade as part of their growth 
strategies. If developing country exporters cannot adequately monitor the conditions of 
foreign market access, they are ill-informed when WTO violations occur, and they will 
be unable to use the threat of or actual resort to WTO dispute settlement to convince 
trading partners to fulfill their commitments to keep markets open. 
The next section provides a more detailed discussion of the theory behind calls for 
additional and refocused monitoring activity on behalf of developing country exporters in 
the WTO system. While we describe how the WTO Secretariat makes important 
contributions in this area, we also identify where more efforts are needed given that much 
of the WTO’s monitoring effort is not targeted towards providing information to the 
private sector (firms and their advocates). This information is necessary, for example, if 
such firms are going make a rational decision on whether to self-enforce their trading 
interests by convincing their policymakers to engage in the dispute settlement process on 
their behalf. We conclude that there is a role for substantial expansion of monitoring and 
surveillance, and we then describe a number of monitoring initiatives that the ‘extra-
WTO’ community (World Bank-sponsored Global Antidumping Database and Global 
Trade Alert) undertook in the midst of the global economic crisis in 2009. We detail how 
such initiatives have created useful inputs that could be repackaged to further the 
  6monitoring agenda. Finally, we outline the key questions that such inputs must be used to 
answer in order to more directly assist the interests of developing country exporters so as 
to allow them to better utilise the WTO system, including its dispute settlement 
provisions. 
In the third section, the discussion turns to a specific appraisal of the strongest 
immediate term needs for additional information generation, given the legacy of potential 
violations of WTO commitments over market access spurred by the global economic 
crisis of 2008–2009. The paper concludes by providing a reminder that while it is 
important to monitor and address any new crisis-generated trade barriers, developing 
country exporters have systemic monitoring needs whether or not the global economy is 
in crisis. Furthermore, some of these needs may change in the future depending on the 
conclusion of the Doha Round and any new multilateral agreements on climate change 
and border taxes. 
 
2. THEORY AND INPUTS TO MONITORING WTO COMMITMENTS 
 
This section briefly reviews the theory behind the importance of monitoring foreign 
market access commitments in the WTO system. We then discuss actual monitoring 
efforts undertaken in the WTO system, especially as such efforts have been changing in 
response to the global economic crisis of 2008–2009. Finally, we turn to how other 
groups might best utilise the data provided by these new initiatives to inform exporters in 
developing countries. Such exporters seek information on how changing policies may 
have affected their foreign market access interests and whether WTO dispute settlement 
  7is a viable possibility for them to engage with their policymakers to self-enforce their 
trading interests. 
 
The theory behind public sector monitoring of WTO commitments 
 
Any discussion of how best to structure public resources dedicated to the monitoring of 
international market access commitments must be grounded in theory. Here we draw on 
the theory provided in Bown (2009a) which considers the issue from the perspective of 
the exporting firm whose market access interests are at the heart of international trade.
 4 
The exporting firm has expectations of access to foreign markets that its government 
negotiated on its behalf and which are bound into the foreign country’s WTO 
commitments. Now it is up to the exporting firm and its advocates to keep the foreign 
market open, which sometimes means through self-enforcement and utilising the formal 
WTO process of dispute settlement.  
In the theoretical model, the exporting firm needs the capacity to work with its 
government officials to potentially use WTO dispute settlement to self-enforce its access 
to foreign markets. Suppose a foreign government imposes a WTO-violating trade or 
trade-related measure that eliminates that firm’s market access. We define ‘monitoring’ 
as the generation of sufficiently precise information on the cause of an exporter’s loss of 
foreign market access and the benefit to this policy being reversed, so that the exporter 
can make an informed decision based on a cost–benefit analysis of whether to engage 
                                                           
4 This section in particular draws heavily from the arguments in Bown (2009a, chapter 5), to which the 
reader is pointed for a more detailed discussion of the theory. See also Bown and Hoekman (2005). 
  8government policymakers to use formal WTO dispute settlement on its behalf.
5 Self-
enforcement of any foreign market entails a cost. From an economic modelling 
perspective, this foreign-market specific cost is similar (though in addition) to what an 
exporting firm must spend to adapt and market its product to new foreign consumers, or 
to establish a new network to deliver it to them. The main difference between the cost of 
self-enforcement and these other costs of supplying to a foreign market is that the latter 
are entirely borne by the exporter, whereas self-enforcement costs are sometimes ‘shared’ 
because of the positive externalities generated. Because trade policies are typically quite 
blunt, the effort of keeping a foreign market open to one exporter has implications for 
other exporters as well. This possibility for sharing both creates an additional set of 
complications and generates a role for the public sector.
6 
For an exporter to use WTO dispute settlement to reopen a market that has been 
closed with a WTO-violating policy, the first step is to generate technical information on 
the cause of lost foreign market access, compiled from economic, legal and political 
                                                           
5 This discussion is admittedly partial equilibrium in nature as it completely abstracts from other costs 
impeding the firm from engaging its government in WTO dispute settlement. Many of these other 
impediments are noteworthy; they are addressed more fully in Bown (2009a). The idea here is to focus 
entirely on one particularly critical problem facing developing country exporters in the WTO system, and 
that is the lack of economic, legal, and political information that they need to even begin consideration of 
whether to engage in WTO dispute settlement. 
6 An alternative model (and motivation) for which monitoring might be useful is if it provides additional 
information within the policy-imposing country. For example, the provision of new information on the 
expected domestic cost of a particular welfare-reducing policy implemented by one government ministry 
could engage other ministries which may have access to more efficient policy instruments.  
  9expertise.
7 The legal information is evidence of a violation of WTO commitments or 
obligations. There are at least two needs for economic information, including both the 
economic importance of the WTO-violating cause of lost exports and the economic 
assurance that any WTO violation was both an important cause of the lost exports and 
that the loss was not caused by a (simultaneous) change in alternative factors unrelated to 
the violation – e.g., a recession, increased competition from fair alternative (foreign or 
domestic) sources, or something else. Finally, the political information includes estimated 
probabilities that the foreign country will engage in policy reform and compliance with 
potential WTO rulings, as well as the potential form of the compliance and whether that 
is likely to result in substantial additional market access. 
  The generation of such information requires technical expertise in economics, law 
and politics. This information is costly for the exporter to acquire, though the argument is 
that in a self-enforcing system like the WTO, this information must be available to the 
exporter to successfully and sustainably engage in international trade. In many developed 
countries, the evidence is that firms have been able to overcome the cost hurdle of 
generating this information through a combination of at least three routes: 1) they are 
sufficiently profitable to pay private actors to monitor their own foreign market access 
interests; 2) they have organised with other local exporting firms cost-sharing 
arrangements by forming industry and trade associations to monitor common foreign 
                                                           
7  We present our discussion through the lens of WTO dispute settlement. However, there are other 
mechanisms that serve as complements to formal dispute settlement which could also benefit from the 
additional generation of technical information. Examples include various committees within the WTO, as 
well as external networks of technical officials and standard-setting groups, such as Codex Alimentarius. 
For a discussion, see Hoekman and Kostecki (2009). 
  10market access interests jointly; or 3) their governments have undertaken efforts to provide 
foreign market access monitoring on their behalf.
8 Because these three options for 
monitoring are less likely outside industrialised countries, insufficient private sector 
resources are dedicated to monitoring the foreign market access interests of exporters in 
developing countries.  
Given this theory and evidence, Bown (2009a, chapter 8) takes the approach of 
proposing a new independent and multilateral monitoring body called the Institute for 
Assessing WTO Commitments (IAWC).
 9 While the proposed IAWC would rely on the 
rules and procedures of the WTO system for providing its assessments, it would be 
established, funded and governed separately and independently from the WTO 
Secretariat.
10 The primary purpose of the IAWC would be to address the problem that we 
                                                           
8 See Bown (2009a, chapter 5) for a more complete discussion and examples of 1) and 2). Examples of 3) 
would include the US Trade Representative’s National trade estimate report on foreign trade barriers, the 
EC Directorate General-Trade’s Market access database, and Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (METI)’s Report on the WTO inconsistency of trade policies by major trading partners. Most 
developing countries do not have such a sophisticated system in place. This is not to suggest that devoting 
resources at the national level is the optimal approach, this is merely to provide evidence that national 
governments in industrialised countries have recognised the need for the public sector to provide additional 
monitoring of WTO commitments and this is how they have chosen to respond. Our proposal below 
presents an alternative approach where monitoring is not constrained to take place at the national level. 
9 For examples of similar calls for increased monitoring and surveillance by the extra-WTO community, 
see Gallagher and Stoler (2009) and also Hufbauer (2009).  
10 It is not necessary for the reader to take the IAWC literally. Instead it is sufficient to think of the 
proposed IAWC as identifying the different topic areas that a number of groups might target separately. 
Such groups might include networks of think tanks, research institutes, and even more technically 
  11identified above – i.e., to create and package additional information of use to exporters in 
developing countries whose monitoring needs are insufficiently addressed – whether that 
is because their exported products were: 1) not profitable enough for them to bear the 
costs privately; or the firms were unable to reduce the cost burden by cost-sharing 2) with 
other firms because of the inability to organise into trade associations and/or 3) with their 
government, because the government did not have the institutional infrastructure in place 
to provide those services. The proposed information generation services of the IAWC 
would complement other development-focused initiatives in the WTO system, such as the 
2001 establishment of the independent Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL), the main 
legal assistance centre for developing countries in the WTO system.
11  
  The rest of this contribution addresses the greatest monitoring needs of exporting 
firms in developing countries, applied to the context of new developments resulting from 
the global economic crisis of 2008–2009. These monitoring needs, and hence the 
‘monitoring’ information that the public sector should provide, are also influenced by the 
supply of WTO-inconsistent policies arising in the trading system. After describing 
                                                                                                                                                                             
sophisticated, development-focused non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The important point is that 
such information and analysis at the heart of the proposed monitoring work programme would be generated 
outside the WTO Secretariat. For political reasons, any increased substantive monitoring efforts undertaken 
by the WTO Secretariat might adversely affect its other important roles in the system – as forums for 
negotiation (multilateral rounds) and litigation (neutral arbiter of disputes). 
11 For discussions of the ACWL, see Van der Borght (1999), Bown (2009a, chapter 6), or Bown and 
McCulloch (2010). However, while the IAWC would provide information that ultimately might be an input 
into the WTO dispute resolution process – i.e., to the exporting firms in developing countries, as well as 
their advocates (including the ACWL) – the IAWC would not be involved in the actual WTO litigation 
process. 
  12existing monitoring initiatives in the next section, we will then turn to some of the 
potentially important focus areas spurred on by new and potentially WTO-inconsistent 
policies brought on by the 2008–2009 global economic crisis.  
 
A brief history of monitoring before and during the global economic crisis 
 
While the last section highlighted the theory behind public sector monitoring of export 
market access interests of developing countries, we do not mean to suggest that public 
monitoring does not yet exist. This section reviews both the state of monitoring prior to 
2009 and the new monitoring initiatives and developments that took place in 2009, 
spurred on by the global economic crisis. Many of the developments of 2009 in particular 
have resulted in a tremendous amount of new and useful information. However, this 
information still needs to be analysed by technical experts and repackaged to be made 
useful to exporters in developing countries. 
  Prior to 2009, most of the public monitoring that actually took place was done by 
the WTO. Through its performance of national Trade Policy Reviews of member 
economies, and by serving as a repository for government notification of changes in trade 
and trade-related policies, the WTO both laid the groundwork for other groups to monitor 
and provided most of the global monitoring efforts itself.
12 However, in the context of the 
firm-level model presented in the last section, there are two main concerns with the WTO 
                                                           
12 See Bown and Hoekman (2008) for a critique of the WTO’s current Trade Policy Review process. Bown 
(2009a, chapter 8) details other pre-crisis efforts to provide information beyond that being generated by the 
WTO Secretariat, including the Global Subsidies Initiative and the Global Antidumping Database that is 
described in more detail below. 
  13taking on this role. First, the WTO was not given the mandate to provide sufficiently 
detailed information on changes in policies to be of use to private sector agents – whether 
it be a firm or an advocate working on its behalf.
13 Second, given its other important 
roles in the system, it may be politically quite difficult for the WTO Secretariat to play an 
active monitoring and information generation role. 
The global economic crisis took hold in late 2008, and by early 2009 a number of 
new initiatives provided additional information and data of use to the monitoring agenda. 
Much of the information could be especially useful for those interested in improving 
understanding of changes to the foreign market access opportunities facing exporters in 
developing countries. Table 1 presents a timeline of a number of major information-
generating announcements in 2009 that focuses on three entities: the WTO Secretariat, 
the World Bank-sponsored Global Antidumping Database, and the Global Trade Alert.  
The WTO Secretariat did respond in 2009 with more frequent updates and 
information useful for monitoring. In April 2009 it began to provide quarterly lists of 
trade and trade-related measures imposed during the crisis – with data taken from official 
and also unofficial (news) sources. An explicit statement did accompany the lists, stating 
that, despite a measure being included in the document, the WTO itself was not making 
any judgment as to its potential consistency with any commitments or obligations.
14 
                                                           
13 Consider a policy like antidumping – the information that the WTO reports on behalf of its member 
countries is neither timely (it arrives with a substantial lag) or detailed enough (no tariff-line codes of 
products affected) to be of use to analysts seeking to make sense of the economic market implications of 
the potential barrier. 
14 Footnote 1 of the April 20 list (WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1) states: ‘This is intended to be a 
purely factual report and is issued under the sole responsibility of the Director-General. It has no legal 
  14While the lists were quite a useful first step, they nevertheless still generated few 
additional details that could be used by an analyst to help determine whether such a 
measure was an economically important cause of a reduction to its country’s exports.  
A second example was the World Bank’s continued sponsorship of the Global 
Antidumping Database, including a quarterly updating initiative begun in March 2009 
that provided detailed information on new trade remedy investigations and trade barriers 
being imposed under antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard provisions.
15 The 
main distinction between the Global Antidumping Database and other initiatives was the 
level of detail. For example, by including information on Harmonized System (HS) tariff 
line product codes and the names of firms subject to the new trade restrictions (as well as 
those behind the investigating petitions), analysts could match the information on 
                                                                                                                                                                             
effect on the rights and obligations of Members, nor does it have any legal implication with respect to the 
conformity of any measure noted in the report with any WTO Agreement or any provision thereof. This 
report is without prejudice to Members' negotiating positions in the Doha Round. It is a preparatory 
contribution to the report by the Director-General that is called for in Paragraph G of the TPRM mandate 
and that aims to assist the TPRB to undertake an annual overview of developments in the international 
trading environment which are having an impact on the multilateral trading system.’ 
15 In the interest of full disclosure, the author was the initiator of the Global Antidumping Database project 
in 2004 and has managed the project since its inception, with financial resources provided from the World 
Bank. Some seed funding for the project in 2004 came from Brandeis University. Since 2005, the Internet-
based and freely available Global Antidumping Database has provided detailed, tariff-line, and firm-level 
data on national use of trade remedies such as antidumping, safeguards, and countervailing measures. In 
2009, the initiative was significantly expanded to include additional policies and countries (which were 
using such policies more frequently in light of the global economic crisis), as well updating the information 
updating more often – i.e., quarterly. See Bown (2010) for more details. 
  15potential new trade barriers to other complementary databases (e.g., on trade flows) to 
determine how economically important any given policy action would be. 
Such an approach was also adopted by a new initiative launched in June 2009 
called the Global Trade Alert.
  16 The Global Trade Alert (GTA) was designed to go 
beyond the trade remedy data provided in the Global Antidumping Database to catalogue 
and detail dozens of other types of trade and trade-related measures – e.g., changes in 
tariffs, import licensing, government procurement, imposition of subsidies, and changes 
in technical and sanitary or phytosanitary standards among others. Many interpreted the 
GTA’s contributions throughout the global economic crisis as being intended to ‘name 
and shame’ government policymakers by raising the public profile of trade policy 
actions. Perhaps government officials would think twice about how they structured new 
policy initiatives if they were concerned that the GTA would flag their policies with a red 
triangle that indicated ‘the measure has been implemented and almost certainly 
discriminates against foreign commercial interests.’ Nevertheless, the publicity around 
the GTA has resulted in critics of its own. Some focused on the utility of the information 
being provided for understanding the scale of the spread of protectionism taking hold 
during the global crisis, given the lack of comparable pre-crisis data available to use as a 
benchmark. Others argued that the GTA was overstating the incidence of protectionism 
which could provide fodder and cover for other policymakers interested in increasing 
                                                           
16 For a discussion see Evenett (2009). According to the Global Trade Alert website, it is coordinated by the 
Centre for Economic Policy Research (London), and its funders include The World Bank, UK’s Trade 
Policy Unit (combining the Department for International Development and the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills), the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Canada’s Centre for International 
Governance Innovation, and Canada’s International Development Research Centre.  
  16future protectionism.
17 We do not address such critiques here. Instead, the next section 
focuses on how groups might use the tremendous amount of information compiled into 
the GTA and the Global Antidumping Database to improve the quality of information 
provided to developing country exporters in the WTO system regarding the potential 
infringement of their market access rights. 
 
The four questions that information generated from these new initiatives could help 
answer 
 
The GTA and Global Antidumping Database provide raw data and information. Their main 
contributions to date were not to perform the technically demanding task of packaging the 
raw information into the format needed for exporters and their advocates in developing 
countries in the context of potential WTO dispute settlement. Here we address the 
question of how others can adapt the information now available to put it to good use.  
Begin with the considerable GTA efforts of identifying trade-related measures, 
and its approach of ‘red flagging’ certain measures based on whether they are likely to 
have a negative impact on foreign commercial interests. For an exporting firm in a 
developing country and its advocates to make a sufficiently informed cost–benefit 
analysis of whether to use WTO dispute settlement to attempt to reopen a market that was 
closed off during the crisis, they require answers to at least four questions:  
                                                           
17  Criticisms of the GTA and the impact of such monitoring activity during the crisis include Rodrik 
(2009); see also the Reuters interview with Richard Eglin, Director of the WTO’s Trade Policies Review 
Division (Lynn, 2009).  
 
  17 
(1)  What is the likelihood of a WTO finding of a legal inconsistency of any particular 
measure?  
(2)  How large is the lost foreign market access at stake? 
(3)  Was this WTO violation a sufficiently important economic cause of lost foreign 
market access?  
(4)  What is the legal-political likelihood as well as the form of compliance of the 
respondent with any WTO rulings? 
 
If resources were not a constraint, the idea would be to take every red-flagged measure in 
the GTA database, as well as every imposed antidumping, countervailing duty, or 
safeguard measure found in the Global Antidumping Database, and to evaluate each 
according to the answers to these four questions. Specifically, an analyst would use legal 
expertise to clarify the likelihood that the existing WTO jurisprudence would determine 
that there has been a violation of commitments. Then she would take the information on 
the HS codes and match them to trade flow data to determine how much market access is 
at stake. Third, additional economic expertise would be used in an attempt to clarify the 
extent to which the new trade barrier was the cause of the lost market access as opposed 
to being due to some other cause.
18 Finally, legal and political expertise would be 
                                                           
18 Admittedly, disentangling the economic impact of any potential WTO violations from other causes may 
be quite challenging given the environment generated by the timing of the global economic crisis. For 
example, there was tremendous volatility and turmoil in markets during 2008–2009, and in many instances 
it may be difficult to distinguish the impact of a WTO-violating policy from other ‘natural’ economic 
activity that was simultaneously taking place – e.g., the negative demand shock associated with the 
  18combined to assign a probability to the likelihood that the policy-imposing country will 
comply with WTO rulings and implement a change in policy that results in market 
access.  
In economic terms, the purpose of combining such economic, legal and political 
expertise is to provide the exporting firm with an expected value of the payoff to pursuing 
a WTO dispute, so that the firm can weigh that expected benefit against the expected cost 
of engaging in WTO dispute settlement.
19 Only an exporter that is informed about the 
expected benefits and costs of engaging the WTO’s self-enforcement system can make 
rational decisions regarding whether to use it.  
This section has presented a basic template by which experts in economics, law, 
and politics would band together to use data provided by monitoring initiatives such as 
the Global Antidumping Database and GTA to generate and better package information 
of use to exporters in developing countries. We have not yet addressed the reality of 
resource limitations and the need for public good-minded analysts to prioritise their 
efforts based on (i) the (demand side) needs of particular interest to developing countries, 
(ii) the types of trade barriers being imposed (supply side), and (iii) the largest gap of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
recession. Furthermore, consider an example like the US bailout of the automobile sector that we discuss in 
more detail below. In this case, there was an almost simultaneous demand shock (in 2008) induced by high 
petrol prices and increased recognition of the impact of climate change that may have changed the tastes 
and preferences of consumers towards different types (of more fuel-efficient) cars. 
19 Of course an expected value is only one summary statistic – the exporter is also likely to be interested in 
the statistical distribution of possible outcomes to a potential dispute. This includes its expected payoff 
under various forms of ‘partial’ compliance, whether that partiality in compliance is due to differences in 
the timing of implementation or the completeness with which the trade barrier is removed. 
  19missing information that is not being generated by other sources, such as private firms 
themselves. This is the focus of the next section.  
 
3. MONITORING NEEDS DUE TO POTENTIAL CRISIS-INDUCED ABUSES 
OF WTO COMMITMENTS 
 
The global financial crisis of 2008–2009 resulted in a severe economic recession in many 
countries that heightened political pressure to respond with new policy initiatives. In the 
face of increased political pressure to respond quickly, it is likely that governments 
increased the amount of policymaking activity that would both adversely affect 
foreigner’s market access and violate WTO commitments, and that this activity would be 
above even the ‘normal’ levels that take place under calmer economic conditions. Below 
we consider three different categories of crisis-induced policies – 1) trade remedies 2) 
other import border measures, and 3) subsidies and other behind-the-border measures. To 
guide the discussion, we turn to examples of trade barriers identified by initiatives such 
as the Global Antidumping Database, Global Trade Alert, and WTO Secretariat; from 
which it may turn out that there are dozens of examples of countries imposing policies in 
potentially WTO-inconsistent and economically meaningful ways. 
Because there are dozens and perhaps hundreds of new crisis-era policies alone 
that could be subject to the additional analytical scrutiny of ‘monitoring’ by the technical 
experts (economists, lawyers and political scientists) best suited to advising developing 
country exporters, we also provide an analytical discussion of which policies should be 
subject to such additional scrutiny. From the demand-side perspective, we focus on 
  20developing countries and their small profit-margin industries – i.e., firms for which it is 
unlikely that sufficient extra resources are available to coordinate politically and engage 
in the self-monitoring that may occur through trade associations or national governments 
on their behalf. Within the supply side of new trade-restricting policies to consider, our 
decision on where to apply additional analytical public resources is guided by a focus on 
potential WTO violations of national treatment, or a policy that discriminates between 
domestic firms and foreign firms. These are the policies likely to affect many diffuse 
exporters; i.e., policies to which challenges are otherwise least likely because the 
coordination across many foreign interests is most difficult.  
Before turning to the three categories of policies identified above, it is worth 
repeating that the data and information generated by initiatives such as the GTA, Global 
Antidumping Database, and the WTO Secretariat are still primitive and merely an input 
for others to use. These sources admittedly provide little information on the key questions 
(1) through (4) identified above. Teams of economists, lawyers and political analysts with 
technical expertise must work together to match up the primitive data from these sources 
with more detailed information on trade flows, market conditions, and industry and firm 
performance. With respect to any potential trade barrier identified by these initiatives, 
exporting firms and their government policymakers require answers to these four 
questions in order to make the larger expected cost–benefit calculation. Without this 
information they will be unable make a rational determination of whether to raise the 
issue of a potential WTO violation with trading partners; and subsequently whether to 
bring this matter to the WTO, potentially for dispute settlement. 
 
  21Crisis-induced abuses of trade remedies? 
 
In times of economic downturn, it is common for domestic industries to petition their 
governments under trade remedy laws such as antidumping, countervailing duties, and 
safeguards for new import-protecting measures (Knetter and Prusa, 2003; Irwin, 2005). 
As figure 1 indicates, the global economic recession in 2008–2009 was no different. The 
beginning of the crisis in 2008 led to a 35% increase in investigations relative to those 
that had taken place in 2007 before the crisis, and the 2009 increase was another 19.6% 
higher than the level in 2008 (figure 1a). Second, given the typical 12–18 month lag 
between the initiation of a new trade remedy investigation and the final decision to 
impose definitive trade barriers, any increase in new import restrictions associated with 
the crisis did not take hold until late 2009. Overall, there was a 29.5% increase in the 
number of new (definitive) product-level import restrictions in 2009 compared to 2008 
(figure 1b), though most of this is driven by an increase during the fourth quarter of 2009.  
The fact that a domestic industry files a petition for a trade remedy investigation 
or that the government grants the request and imposes a new trade barrier is not evidence 
itself of a WTO violation. Indeed, the WTO’s Agreement on Antidumping, Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and Agreement on Safeguards, as well as 
close to 15 years worth of WTO jurisprudence, create conditions under which national 
governments are permitted to investigate such requests and authorised to respond with 
new import restrictions. However, these WTO Agreements each require that two basic 
pieces of evidence be provided in order to justify the imposition of a new trade barrier. 
While injury to the domestic industry is one necessary component required in each of the 
  22Agreements, injury by itself is insufficient. The injury must be accompanied by evidence 
that the injury was caused by either dumped (antidumping), subsidised (CVD), or surging 
(safeguard) imports, and government investigators are supposed to rule out that the injury 
was caused by something else. The massive negative demand shock associated with the 
global economic recession is one example of ‘something else’ that is not related to 
imports, but  that may have caused injury. Other examples may be industry or (domestic) 
firm specific: is there evidence that consumer tastes and preferences have changed in 
ways that led to injury? Was the domestic industry plagued by firms that were poorly 
managed or which made bad decisions? In light of such possibilities, in some 
jurisdictions WTO violations may occur because national administrators of these trade 
remedy investigations are not paying sufficient attention to the causal link between unfair 
(dumped or subsidised) or fair (but surging) imports and undeniable evidence of injury to 
the domestic industry.  
Are such potential abuses of importance to developing country exports? Given 
that roughly 75% of the trade remedy investigations and measures (that are exporting 
country specific, such as antidumping, CVD and China-specific safeguards) imposed 
during the crisis have targeted developing countries and that these are increasing 
compared to pre-crisis levels (Bown, 2010), this would suggest that they are important. 
Furthermore, consider the historical data on WTO dispute settlement. First, as figure 2a 
indicates, over 40% of all WTO disputes initiated between 2001 and 2008 involved 
allegations of WTO-inconsistent antidumping, countervailing, or safeguard measures. 
Second, such policies are the targets most frequently challenged by developing countries 
under the WTO – nearly 50% of all of the disputes they initiated between 2001 and 2008 
  23concerned these sorts of trade remedies (Figure 2b). Thus there is a strong presumption 
that there will be many new WTO disputes initiated by developing countries over the 
crisis-era use of trade remedies against their exports. 
However, the main question is whether additional public resources should be 
devoted to providing answers to the technical questions (1) through (4) raised above 
concerning trade remedies imposed during the crisis. Perhaps surprisingly, if the 
discussion of the next two sections reveals that there are many additional types of trade 
barriers that require publicly-assisted scrutiny, the answer to this question may be no.  
Despite these trade barriers being important for developing country exporters to 
target, there are at least three reasons why they should not necessarily be subject to 
additional publicly-funded scrutiny that would come at the expense of a closer 
examination of other crisis-era trade barriers. First, of all the trade barriers, trade 
remedies are possibly the easiest for any exporting firm (that has been hit by them) to 
understand and for it then to demonstrate to its government that it has been adversely 
affected by a potential economically important WTO violation. Indeed the evidence from 
the pre-crisis use of WTO dispute settlement indicates that even without any new public 
assistance monitoring, many developing countries have logged a strong record of 
successfully engaging the WTO dispute settlement system to challenge imposed trade 
remedies. Second, an additional concern that we have not yet addressed is that limited 
public resources may best target the sorts of trade barriers imposed during the crisis that 
are least likely to be removed on their own. While one should not go so far as to say that 
imposed trade remedies are automatically removed, the WTO Agreements describing 
how they are to be used contain sunset provisions (antidumping, CVD) or phase-outs 
  24(safeguards), and this increases the chance that trade remedies imposed during the crisis 
will eventually be removed without resort to WTO dispute settlement.
20 Third, public 
resources are best utilised to combat the free-rider and problems of coordinating and 
organising exporters in different countries that are jointly affected by a trading partner’s 
new trade barrier that violates the WTO principle of national treatment. Because 
antidumping and countervailing measures are exporter-specific, to the extent that trade 
remedies need additional publicly-funded information, the analysis should target new 
trade barriers implemented as global safeguards, and not antidumping or CVDs. 
 
Other tariff and non-tariff barriers imposed at the border? 
 
WTO Members do not limit their policy interventions to trade remedies such as 
antidumping, countervailing duties, or safeguards. Thus focusing exclusively on these 
policies is likely to miss part of the story of WTO violations affecting developing country 
exports during the crisis. Consider table 2, which provides a summary of the Global 
Trade Alert’s reporting of various types of trade-related policies during the global 
economic crisis. While the table indicates that trade remedies result in an important 
category of new trade-related measures, policymakers have also resorted to other types of 
border measures (such as increased tariffs, new quotas, or import bans) to restrict market 
access to foreigners during the crisis.  
                                                           
20 This is not to indicate that WTO Members all follow the sunset provisions on antidumping – there is 
some evidence to the contrary. See, for example Moore (2006) as well as Cadot, de Melo and Tumurchudur 
(2007). Hence whether sunset provisions are followed in the future will require additional monitoring. 
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questions regarding the expected impact of a new trade barrier? To address this question, 
we go through the exercise of examining a specific example of a GTA announcement. 
Consider the Brazilian government’s decision in August 2009 to increase its ad-valorem 
import duty from 2% to 14% for industrial fatty alcohols.
21 First, the GTA takes care to 
note that the average bound tariff of the products concerned is 35% and that the products 
were on the list of exceptions of Mercosur’s common external tariff, and they are now 
back to their original rate. Thus a simple examination of this information suggests that 
while Brazil may have imposed a new import restriction with this applied tariff increase, 
there is no obvious WTO violation – e.g., such as when a country increases its applied 
tariff above the binding rate. Regarding the first question of whether such a measure is 
likely be legally challengeable at the WTO, since there is no evidence to suggest a 
violation, the analyst might stop there and move on to assessing the next measure on the 
GTA list. 
However, suppose just for the sake of our hypothetical exercise that the Brazilian 
tariff increase on industrial fatty alcohols did contain a potential WTO violation that 
satisfied question (1). How could an analyst begin to use the data provided by the GTA to 
address the other three questions to which answers are needed for an exporter or its 
advocate to make an informed cost–benefit assessment of whether to engage in WTO 
dispute settlement? Because the GTA also explicitly identifies the HS codes at issue 
under the measure, an outside analyst could take this information and answer question (2) 
                                                           
21 See Global Trade Alert ‘Brazil: tariff increase from 2% to 14% on industrial fatty alcohols,’ Measure 
#1035, Published 17 Dec 2009. The tariff lines that the GTA reports as being raised are for products 
  26– i.e., the size of the market at stake and the likely importance of this market to foreign 
exporters in developing countries. 
In table 3 we address this question by taking the information on the 6-digit HS 
product codes that the GTA provides and matching them to import data made available 
for free on the Internet by the United Nations through Comtrade.
22 First, are developing 
country exporters affected by this measure? The answer is clearly yes, as five out the top 
seven foreign sources of Brazilian imports of this product in recent years were 
developing countries (India, Indonesia, Malaysia, China and South Africa). Second, how 
large were these exports and was there a substantial reduction in exports associated with 
the new trade barrier? For these five developing countries, annual exports prior to the 
crisis were not trivial, as they ranged from US$ 2 million to US$ 16 million per country 
per year, which is well within the range of the size of exports associated with a number of 
disputes recently initiated by developing countries.
23 While Brazilian imports from each 
of these sources did fall substantially in 2009, as indicated earlier, it may be hard to 
attribute this (without more information) to the Brazilian tariff increase, given the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
3823.70.10 and 3823.70.20. 
22 In this particular case the measure was applied at the 8-digit level, and since the UN data is only provided 
at the 6-digit HS level there may be some mismeasurement. Furthermore, the 2009 import statistics may 
not be completely accurate if all of the 2009 import data has not yet been reported to Comtrade. 
Nevertheless, even reliance on the data for the earlier years in table 3 provides revealing information. 
23 See, for example, Bown (2009a, chapter 6, table 6-6) which reports the size of exports of stake in a 
number of recent WTO disputes filed by developing countries regarding foreign imposition of antidumping 
measures against their exporters. This list included seven examples of disputes over products with (pre-
trade barrier levels of) bilateral exports of less than US$ 12 million per year. 
  27possibility that the global recession may have had negative demand-side implications 
placing downward pressure on Brazilian imports of this product as well.
24  
Finally, is this particular trade barrier emblematic of one likely to affect multiple 
foreign countries (violating the national treatment principle) and thus an example where 
affected exporters might have difficulty coordinating due to a free-rider problem? The 
answer to this question as revealed by the data is also yes, given that there is no dominant 
foreign supplier of this product to this market. Even the largest foreign suppliers (the 
USA and Germany) have exports that are quite small by their country’s (relative) 
complainant standard threshold for pursuing WTO disputes; thus it is unlikely that these 
industrialised countries would put a priority on using litigation over this particular 
Brazilian measure.  
The implication of this exercise is, had the assessment of question (1) resulted in a 
WTO violation, using the information provided by the GTA matched to publicly 
available trade data to assess question (2) suggests that this measure might be one that a 
development-focused outside analyst would want to generate more information on so as 
to assist the adversely affected exporters in India, Indonesia, Malaysia, China, and South 
Africa. Furthermore, it is important to point out that because of the work already 
provided by the GTA, with the free data from UN Comtrade available on the Internet, it 
took us less than 30 minutes to provide a quick snapshot answer to this question. 
                                                           
24 This is also likely given that the GTA reports the Brazilian tariff increase only took place at the end of 
August, meaning that eight months worth of 2009 imports of this product came in under the 2% tariff. Thus 
additional work and information would be needed to answer questions (3) and (4), if the information 
revealed by answering question (2) indicated that this particular measure was worth looking at in more 
detail. 
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these other types of import border measure were the second most frequent (after trade 
remedies) subject of formal WTO dispute settlement challenges by developing countries. 
Based on evidence from the historical pattern of WTO dispute settlement, it is likely that 
crisis-era border measures such as new tariffs, import quotas and bans, as well as changes 
to procedures for licensing or customs evaluation are likely to result in new disputes 
initiated by developing countries on behalf of their exporters. 
 
Crisis-induced abuses of subsidies and other behind the border measures? 
 
The macroeconomic crisis and the threat of a deepening recession in 2008–2009 led 
many governments to adopt interventionist fiscal policies and impose other behind the 
border measures that may have had an impact on foreign market-access commitments in 
WTO-inconsistent ways. Again, the statistics compiled from the GTA (table 2) provide 
evidence of a number of measures that analysts could investigate systematically by 
sequentially addressing the technical questions (1) through (4) identified above. 
Consider the broad category of subsidies. First, many national governments 
responded to shocks in aggregate demand by implementing sizeable stimulus packages. 
Some countries subsidised specific firms and industries – examples include the highly 
publicised US bailout of General Motors and Chrysler; the US government bailing out 
firms in mortgage, banking, insurance, and other areas of financial services, and the 
  29European Community acting through financial interventions in dairy markets.
25 With the 
massive drop in global trade flows in late 2008 and early 2009, a number of governments 
(e.g., those of Brazil, India, China and Malaysia) intervened to shore up credit markets by 
providing export financing assistance.
26 There is also the concern about competitive 
devaluation of currencies, especially those that may be giving an advantage to exporters 
in one country at the expense of exporters (and competing local producers) in other 
economies. Finally, indirect evidence of increased subsidy use is also consistent with the 
trade remedy data observed and described in the last section (Bown, 2010), and in 
particular the increasing resort to countervailing measures being sought by industries that 
perceive they are being injured by unfair foreign subsidies that have affected their 
exports. 
Subsidies are but one example of ways in which governments may have imposed 
WTO-inconsistent behind-the-border measures during the crisis, which have significant 
impacts on developing country exporters. The lowest set of rows in table 2 indicate that 
the GTA has found numerous other examples of new government policies such as export 
                                                           
25 See Global Trade Alert ‘United States of America: Support for General Motors and Chrysler,’ Measure 
#0274, Published 16 July 2009; Global Trade Alert ‘United States of America: Expanded bailout to 
mortgage guarantors,’ Measure #1048, Published 29 December 2009; and Global Trade Alert ‘EC: 
Measures to “stabilize” markets for certain dairy products,’ Measure #0653, Published 8 September 2009. 
26 See Global Trade Alert ‘Brazil: Public financing for the production of goods for exports by small and 
medium companies (pre-shipment phase),’ Measure #0715, Published 16 September 2009; Global Trade 
Alert ‘Malaysia: Services Export Fund,’ Measure #0697, Published 10 September 2009; Global Trade Alert 
‘India: Pre and post shipment export credit,’ Measure #0614, Published 7 September 2009; and Global 
Trade Alert ‘China: Restructuring of the ship-building industry,’ Measure #0348, Published 7 August 2009. 
 
  30taxes or restrictions (which work similarly to a subsidy to aid local downstream industrial 
consumers at the expense of those located abroad), discriminatory public procurement 
policies (e.g., the so-called ‘Buy-America’ or ‘Buy-China’ provisions), new technical or 
sanitary and phytosanitary barriers (TBT or SPS) imposed without scientific 
justifications, as well as other measures.  
Admittedly, the question of whether each of these applied policies are WTO-
illegal trade barriers (question 1) is quite complex and may be more complicated to 
answer accurately than in the case of the other import border measures described earlier. 
Thus, when it comes to the question of how a development-focused outside analyst would 
go about addressing these four critical questions of interest to exporters, it may be more 
efficient to begin by tackling question (2) rather than question (1) and using it as the first 
screen to determine which measures not to pursue. That is, focus first on the economic 
question of whether any particular behind-the-border measure that the GTA has identified 
as potentially affecting trade has a large impact on exporters in developing countries.
 
Only if this question is answered affirmatively should the more complex question (1) of 
WTO-legality and jurisprudence be addressed.  
Because these sorts of behind-the-border policies are the most complex and 
difficult to understand – both for legal and economic reasons – this is the main area 
where the public sector needs to step in to provide and package more useful information 
for exporters and their advocates in developing countries. Indeed, evidence from the data 
on the historical pattern of WTO dispute initiation over 1995–2008 (figure 2b), indicates 
that while there have been a number of WTO disputes over subsidies and other behind-
the-border measures, very few of them have been brought by developing countries.  
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND A REMINDER NOT TO FORGET PERMANENT AND 
FUTURE MONITORING NEEDS 
 
This paper has focused on the issue of monitoring the foreign market access interests of 
the most vulnerable traders in the WTO system, i.e., the exporters in developing 
countries. These are the groups with insufficient resources to self-monitor their own 
foreign market interests, and for whom monitoring is a critical input if they hope to be 
able to self-enforce their WTO interests through formal dispute settlement. We have used 
economic theory to best identify their monitoring needs, and we have identified a number 
of new initiatives spurred on by the global economic crisis of 2008–2009 that have 
generated important new informational inputs useful for the monitoring agenda. We have 
then described how outside analysts can use these information inputs to help developing 
country exporters and their advocates sort through the legacy of potential WTO-violating 
policies resulting from crisis-era pressures of protectionism and potentially engage the 
WTO dispute settlement process to reopen foreign markets that were shut down. 
  It is important to recognise that while the global economic crisis has created a 
political opportunity to expand the monitoring agenda, especially to address the needs of 
exporters in developing countries, their needs will not disappear once the crisis has 
subsided. While the policy initiatives that tend to threaten the foreign markets of 
developing country exporters may change with the conclusion of the crisis, their need for 
informational assistance and continued vigilance will continue.  
  32  Finally, it is important to note that our focus on the crisis has forced us to also 
ignore a number of likely future monitoring needs of developing countries. For example, 
any positive conclusion to the Doha Round of multilateral negotiations will result in 
WTO Members taking on new commitments. In many instances the implementation may 
involve feet-dragging as it will take place in the most politically sensitive sectors and 
products – i.e., for many industrialised countries, these are the last ‘holdouts’ to 
liberalisation after more than 60 years of multilateral tariff cutting in the GATT/WTO 
system. Furthermore, any agreement establishing consensus rules on issues such as 
climate change and border taxes is likely to generate important monitoring needs on 
behalf of developing country exporters that we have not addressed either. 
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  36Table 1: Timeline of major new monitoring initiatives in the WTO system in 2009 
 
Organisation  Date  Information and Data Provided 
WTO Secretariat – Report to the TPRB from 
the Director-General on the Financial and 
Economic Crisis and Trade-Related 
Developments 
January 23  Identification of the problem of the potential 
of new crisis-induced trade barriers; but no 
provision of any detailed lists of new trade or 
trade-related measures 
World Bank – Global Antidumping Database  March 5  Provides public list and detailed data on 
antidumping use through December 2008 
WTO Secretariat – Report to the TPRB from 
the Director-General on the Financial and 
Economic Crisis and Trade-Related 
Developments 
April 20  Provides public list of trade and trade-related 
measures imposed from September 2008 to 
March 2009 
World Bank – Global Antidumping Database  May 11  Provides public list and detailed data on 
antidumping, global safeguard, China-
specific safeguard, and countervailing duty 
use through March 2009 
Global Trade Alert  June 8  Launch which begins its ongoing and 
continuous provision of detailed and real-
time information on state measures likely to 
affect foreign trading partners 
WTO Secretariat – Report to the TPRB from 
the Director-General on the Financial and 
Economic Crisis and Trade-Related 
Developments 
July 15  Provides public list of trade and trade-related 
measures imposed from 1 March to 19 June 
2009 
World Bank – Global Antidumping Database  July 23  Provides public list and detailed data on 
antidumping, global safeguard, China-
specific safeguard, and countervailing duty 
use through June 2009 
World Bank – Global Antidumping Database  October 21  Provides public list and detailed data on 
antidumping, global safeguard, China-
specific safeguard, and countervailing duty 
use through September 2009 
WTO Secretariat – Overview of 
Developments in the International Trading 
Environment -  Annual Report by the Director-
General 
November 18  Provides public list of trade and trade-related 
measures imposed through October 2009 
    
Sources: The reports to the WTO’s Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) were documents JOB(09)/2, 
WT/TPR/OV/W/1, WT/TPR/OV/W/2, and the November Annual Report by the Director General was 
WT/TPR/OV/12. The monitoring reports for the Global Antidumping Database are all available on line 
at  www.brandeis.edu/~cbown/global_ad/monitoring. The Global Trade Alert’s website is 
at www.globaltradealert.org/ . 
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Table 2: Relative importance of various types of new crisis-era trade measures 












digit HS tariff 
lines affected by 
red-flagged 
measures  
        
Trade remedies (total)  238  67  98  329 
        
Other import-restricting border measures (total)  133  61  110  672 
Tariff measure  113  47  94  543 
Import ban  14  10  11  122 
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)  6  4  5  7 
        
Subsidies (total)  187  162  173  1081 
Bail out/state aid measure  152  141  146  541 
Consumption subsidy  11  5  7  120 
Export subsidy  18  14  16  220 
Trade finance  6  2  4  200 
        
Other behind-the-border (total)  149  63  92  926 
Export taxes or restriction  23  10  18  271 
Intellectual property protection  5  1  1  4 
Investment measure  31  5  18  0 
Local content requirement  18  6  7  187 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measure  17  11  12  39 
Technical Barrier to Trade (TBT)  9  1  3  1 
Public procurement  38  21  25  368 
State trading enterprise  4  4  4  27 
State-controlled company  4  4  4  29 
        
Source: Global Trade Alert, ‘Statistics for Category: Type of Measure,’ as of 3 February 2010. 
 
  38Table 3: Example application of GTA-provided information: 
 Brazil’s bilateral imports (US$) of industrial fatty alcohols, 2003–2009 
 
         
Export  Source  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
         
         
 Total  45,680,422   65,135,237   57,944,889  58,535,407 72,015,018    86,716,220 34,189,731 
         
 Germany   22,928,074   35,164,965   30,283,065 15,105,256 11,251,823    14,849,725  9,776,543 
 USA   7,286,531   11,692,440   8,433,994  12,341,197  13,904,643   13,480,647  9,842,666 
 India   3,376,360   1,495,503   2,618,862  7,432,952  11,852,078   15,718,822  7,225,833 
 Indonesia   5,574,223   7,001,838   8,700,839  8,163,489  7,872,520   12,960,963  4,492,563 
 Malaysia   4,310,667   3,766,553   676,917  6,344,117  11,599,249   11,890,988  366,125 
 China   0   766,879   3,540,019  3,486,252  3,686,913   3,404,722  1,249,271 
 South Africa   630,036   3,202,052   2,079,403  3,351,471  4,518,117   2,128,633  0 
 Other   1,574,531   2,045,007   1,611,790  2,310,673  7,329,675   12,281,720  1,236,730 
         
 
Source: Brazil’s imports of HS code 382370, data from UN Comtrade’s online database (http://comtrade.un.org), accessed on 3 
February 2010.  See Global Trade Alert ‘Brazil: tariff increase from 2% to 14% on industrial fatty alcohols,’ Measure #1035, 
Published 17 December 2009. 
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Source: Quarterly data from the Global Antidumping Database (Bown, 2010). To make comparable the data on 
policy use across different (AD, CVD, SG, CSG) trade remedy laws, AD or CVD investigations (measures) against 
multiple exporting countries are treated as one product-level investigation (measure). Furthermore, to ensure that 
they are not redundant, a WTO Member’s simultaneous AD and CVD investigations (measures) over the same 
product are treated as one investigation (measure). 
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b.  By observability of alleged cause of lost market access and complainant category 
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Source: Figure 2a is Bown (2009a, figure 4–7 p. 80). Figure 2b is Bown (2009a, figure 4–6 p. 79). 
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